Long-Term Liabilities: Everything Matures
Long-term liabilities are obligations falling due more than twelve months out, mainly borrowings, lease liabilities and provisions. Time is the only thing distinguishing them from current liabilities, and every one of them migrates across that line as its own maturity date approaches.
How it works
Borrowings repayable beyond a year, lease liabilities, deferred tax and long-term provisions.
The classification is purely about timing. A five-year loan and a six-month loan are the same kind of obligation to the same kind of lender; one sits here and one sits in current liabilities.
Which means the line migrates. A bond maturing in four years is here; three years later it is current, and nothing about the company changed.
The schedule is the whole point
Total debt says how much. The maturity table says when, and when is what decides the risk. Debt spread evenly across a decade is a running cost; the same total concentrated in one year is a refinancing event.
The table is in the notes of every annual report and takes about a minute to read. It is, for most companies, the single highest-value minute available in the document.
The fixed-floating split is the second disclosure worth finding. Fixed-rate debt has a known cost until maturity; floating-rate debt reprices with the market, so a company with a large floating portion has an interest bill that moves without any new borrowing.
And covenants can collapse the schedule entirely. Loan agreements typically require ratios to be maintained — gearing below a level, interest cover above one. A breach can make the whole balance immediately repayable, which turns a long-term obligation into a current one overnight.
Covenant terms are disclosed, and they are the reason a company with comfortable-looking debt can be in difficulty after one weak quarter.
In practice
Interest cover is the flow measure that matters. Operating income divided by interest expense says how far earnings can fall before the interest bill is unpayable — which is a more direct question than gearing answers.
Pension obligations are the least intuitive item here. A defined benefit scheme’s liability is the present value of future payments, so it moves with the discount rate — the same promises can be worth 300 at one rate and 210 at another. Nothing about the pensions changed; the arithmetic did.
And what the money bought is not on the balance sheet. Debt raised to build a factory that earns more than the interest is a different thing from debt raised to cover trading losses, and the liability line records both identically. The cash flow statement is where the difference is visible.
And acting on any of it in the market costs 2% of a median bar’s range per round trip on this site’s shared price history.
Put the refinancing question on numbers. A company owes 700 long term, spread as 300 in year one, 150 in year two, 100 in year three and 150 beyond. It holds 180 of cash and undrawn facilities and generates about 140 a year of cash from operations.
Year one is the problem and it is arithmetic, not judgement: 300 due against 320 of cash and expected generation leaves nothing for anything else, so the maturity has to be refinanced rather than repaid. Whether that is comfortable depends on credit markets in twelve months’ time, which nobody controls — and the whole calculation is available today from one table in the notes and one line on the cash flow statement.
What long-term liabilities are not
They are not safe because they are distant. Distance shrinks every year.
They are not all borrowings. Leases, provisions and deferred tax sit here too.
They are not fixed in amount. Pension and provision balances are estimates that move.
And they are not immune to acceleration. Covenants exist.
When it fails
Refinancing risk is the failure this line conceals. A company expecting to roll a maturity over is assuming lenders will be willing on the day, and that willingness is not within its control. The years when it is unavailable are the years when the most companies need it.
The second failure is the covenant breach. A weak quarter breaches a ratio, the debt becomes repayable, and the company has to raise money in the worst possible circumstances.
A third is the floating rate exposure. A company with unchanged debt can see its interest bill rise sharply, and gearing will not have moved at all.
A fourth is treating a pension surplus as an asset. It moves with discount rates and it is not distributable.
And a fifth is reading the total instead of the schedule, which is the mistake this entire page exists to argue against.
The original data
Of the 31,760 trading and investing videos in this site’s corpus, 3 have “balance sheet” in the title at
a median of 23,862 views, and 0 have “income statement”. “Cash flow” returns 17 at a median of 67,134.
The relative strength index (“RSI”) returns 844 at a median of 3,907. The counts are in
research/corpus-coverage.json, produced by site/measure_corpus.py.
Three videos on the balance sheet, out of 31,760. The maturity schedule, the fixed-floating split and the covenant terms are three disclosures that between them explain most corporate distress, and all three sit in the notes of documents that are free to download. The reason to read them is not that they are sophisticated — it is that they are the only place the timing is written down, and every ratio on the face of the balance sheet averages that timing away.
Related
Liabilities is the full picture, including which obligations cost interest. Current liabilities is where these end up. And balance sheet is the page the whole side sits on.
Refinancing risk is the thing I underestimated for years. A company does not usually fail because its debt was too large - it fails because a large piece of it came due at a moment when nobody wanted to lend, and that date was printed in the accounts all along.
— Michael Whitman
This page is educational, not financial advice. Test every idea on your own charts before risking money.